SMEs are distinguished by their relatively small size of activity. In most cases, the overall market share of SMEs participating in an agreement should not be significant enough to appreciably affect competition in a market. According to the same reasoning, it is unlikely that an SME will occupy a dominant position in a market. However, CCCS reserves the right to investigate alleged anti-competitive behaviour by an SME if justified. Where SMEs are involved in agreements involving price fixing, tendering manipulation, market sharing or production limitation which, by their very nature, are considered to be restrictive of competition, it is for SMEs to demonstrate a net economic advantage, so that their agreement is not considered a breach of the prohibition in Article 34. However, Article 101(3) allows derogations from this rule where such agreements or practices apply: the Regulation applies Article 101(3) TFEU to certain types of agreements and concerted practices between undertakings whose competitive advantages outs outsteer their anti-competitive effects. Net economic benefit refers to a situation where an agreement has economic benefits that outweigh the adverse effects on competition. Such agreements may, for example, improve production or distribution or promote technical or economic progress. The agreement should contain only those restrictions which are strictly necessary for the realisation of those advantages and should not significantly eliminate competition in the relevant markets. These could be cases where competitors agree to cooperate, for example. B to carry out research and development of a new product or to share their distribution networks in order to reach a greater number of customers.
These agreements can lead to efficiency and productivity gains in the longer term. If their economic benefits outweigh the negative effects on competition and if the terms of the agreement are not unnecessarily restrictive and do not significantly restrict competition, such agreements are not contrary to competition law. As a general rule, an agreement does not raise competition concerns unless it has a significant negative impact on competition. In general, the CCCS considers that an agreement will not have a significant negative impact on competition if: following a 1997 Commission Green Paper on vertical restraints in EU competition policy, Regulation 19/65, as well as Regulation No 19/65. Regulation (EC) No 17/62 (the first EU Competition Policy Regulation adopted to implement Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome) has been amended to pave the way for a Single Block Exemption Regulation (BER) for vertical supply and distribution agreements (Regulation (EU) No 330/2010). Section 34 of the Act prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions of associations of undertakings or concerted practices the object or effect of which is to prevent, restrict or distort competition in Singapore. Price agreements, price agreements, market sharing and the limitation or control of production or investment are almost always contrary to the law, as they are by their nature considered to be substantially restrictive. However, these are not the only examples of anti-competitive agreements. Other examples are price recommendations and the dissemination of economically sensitive information. Article 101(1) TFEU1 prohibits agreements and concerted practices* between companies and groups of undertakings which may affect trade between EU states and whose objective is to prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU internal market. In accordance with Article 101(2), all agreements falling within the scope of Article 101(1) are to be annulled unless they are exempted under Article 101(3).
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Part Three – Internal policies and activities of the Union – Title VII – Common rules on competition, taxation and harmonisation of duties – Chapter 1 – Competition rules – Section 1 – Rules applicable to undertakings – Article 101 (ex Article 81 TEC) (OJ L 101, 31.12.2001, p. 1). OJ L 202, 7.6.2016, p. . . . .